Thе article examines a unique case in the history of the Catholic Church: the execution of Archbishop of York Richard Scrope for his participation in a rebellion against the king in 1405. Conflicts between monarchs and prelates were common in medieval Europe. Occasionally, sovereigns impri­soned recalcitrant hierarchs and might even have physically eliminated them, but never by public execution. The author discusses the possible reasons that led Richard Scrope, who supported Henry Bolingbroke’s ascent to the English throne in 1399, to raise an army against his king. Should the Archbishop’s rebellion be seen in the context of the July 1403 mutiny of Henry and Thomas Percy with whom Scrope was related or should we look for an imitation of Thomas Becket, who openly opposed Henry II to protect the liberties of the English Church? In addition to attempting to find answers to these questions, the article examines the public outcry caused by the execution of the archbishop. First, it deals with the reaction of the papacy and the measures taken by the Archbishop of Canterbury Thomas Arundel to conceal from the people information about the excommunication of those involved in the execution, including the king himself. Second, it deals with the rumors that circulated in English society about the nature of the illness that afflicted Henry immediately after Scrope’s execution. The rumor referred to the king’s illness as leprosy, believing it to be a punishment for shedding the blood of a servant of God. Finally, special attention is given to the cult of the executed Scrope, who was revered as saint and martyr in York. Despite royal prohibitions and even attempts to block access to Scrope’s tomb in York Cathedral, the flow of pilgrims to his burial site continued unabated. The veneration of Richard Scrope was unexpectedly supported by the crown during the reign of the York kings, who saw the executed archbishop as an opponent of the House of Lancaster.

The theory of just war, elaborated by theologians and jurists as early as the early Middle Ages, rested on three interdependent elements: causa iusta, legitimate authority, and the pursuit of peace as the war’s ultimate end. This conceptual triad made it possible to construe war — even between Christians — as a permissible instrument for the restoration of social order and violated legality. Yet, notwithstanding the formal parity of these necessary conditions, the legitimacy of authority remained decisive. Whatever the justice of a cause or the nobility of an end, Christian doctrine categorically forbade private bloodshed as a means of settling disputes. Among medieval theologians who addressed war within Christendom, the English church reformer John Wycliffe occupies a distinctive place. In his critique of warfare, he drew a sharp line between Old Testament and New Testament traditions, grounding his argument against war exclusively in New Testament texts. Exposing the sinful character of wars justified as the defense of laws, Wycliffe described vengeance for an injury as an expression of malice, and the recovery of seized property as avarice. Beyond theoretical reflections on wars in the abstract, he also turned to concrete historical circumstances, for example, the conflict waged by English kings for the French crown. Wycliffe insisted that a good ruler ought to care solely for his own subjects rather than seek the conquest of others’ lands. Wycliffe’s radical repudiation of violence and bloodshed is directly connected to the central theme of his philosophical doctrine, namely his understanding of the nature of power. While affirming the divine origin of all earthly authority, he made its legitimacy contingent upon divine grace, which the ruler could preserve only through uncompromising obedience to God. This entailed observance of evangelical commandments: love of enemies and forgiveness of the wrongs they inflict. From this theological premise Wycliffe derived a consequential political conclusion: for a lawful ruler, the declaration of war signified the loss of divine grace and, hence, of legitimacy itself. In such a case, subjects were released from any obligation to obey royal commands that involved violence.